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"WHO, ME?": A SUPERVISOR'S INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
FOR DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
CRISTOPHER GREER
INTRODUCTION
Suppose you become the victim of intentional discrimination in your
workplace. Perhaps your immediate supervisor, having authority over
such decisions, threatens either not to promote you or to fire you unless
you succumb to his or her sexual advances. Or perhaps you are denied
an employment opportunity for which you are otherwise qualified simply
because you are over forty. If you sue both the company and your super-
visor, a court may determine that you were the subject of intentional
discrimination. If the company is bankrupt or otherwise judgment proof,
however, you may not be compensated for your suffering. Why? The
court may dismiss your claim against your former supervisor because it
interprets the anti-discrimination statutes under which you have sued as
inapplicable to individuals. Although it may seem incredible that the
laws aimed at eliminating employment discrimination would not provide
remedies against individuals who actually violate them, many courts
have so held.'
Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")2
and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA"),3 it is un-
lawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of an individual's race,
color, sex, national origin, or age. Victims of such discrimination choos-
ing to bring legal action often sue both their employer and their supervi-
sor(s) or others who had authority over the decisions or acts which
formed the basis of the alleged discrimination.
At common law, it is well established that the employer is liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior for the intentional torts of its employ-
ees committed in the scope and furtherance of their employment.4 Simi-
larly, courts have imputed liability to an employer for discriminatory
acts of supervisory personnel toward other employees.' Although it
seems clear that an aggrieved party may sue the corporate entity for its
employee's discriminatory acts, it is not clear whether an aggrieved party
may also require that a supervisor be held accountable for his own dis-
1. See infra notes 32-46, 76-83 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
4. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[A] supervi-
sory employee who fires a subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to
do, and the wrongful intent with which he does it does not carry his behavior so far
beyond the orbit of his responsibilities as to excuse the employer.") (citing Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)).
5. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70 (1986); Levendos v. Stern
Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 752 (3rd Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Methodist Evangeli-
cal Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972).
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criminatory acts. In many circumstances, a supervisor sued individually
has defeated a cause of action by successfully arguing that the anti-dis-
crimination statutes do not provide for a remedy against individuals,
only against the employer entity.6
Courts have disagreed, however, over whether the language of Title
VII and the ADEA creates a basis for individual liability. The dispute
involves the construction given to the statutes' definitions of "employer":
specifically, who may be held liable as an employer under these statutes.
Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of
such a person."7 Similarly, the ADEA defines an employer as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more em-
ployees... [and] any agent of such a person."' Several courts have con-
cluded that by including the "any agent of such a person" language in
the statutes, Congress intended to provide for the liability of supervisors
who affect employment decisions.9 Other courts have held that the use
of this language merely ensures that the acts of individuals are imputed
to the employer entity through respondeat superior, and is not intended
to provide for a remedy against the actual individual transgressors.' 0
Part I of this Note discusses the purposes and legislative histories of
Title VII and the ADEA, which reflect Congress' desire to eradicate em-
ployment discrimination. Part II outlines and analyzes the relevant case
law regarding the issue of individual liability for employment discrimina-
tion acts. Part III argues that based on the purposes of the Acts, their
statutory language, and the case law, individuals can and should be held
liable for their discriminatory acts under both Title VII and the ADEA.
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTES
By enacting Title VII in 1964, Congress sought to create a "national
policy of nondiscrimination" in the workplace by prohibiting discrimina-
tion by those controlling employment and promotion. " Accordingly,
courts have held that
6. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Liability of Supervisors, 210 N.Y.L.J.
3 (1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
9. See, e.g., House v. Cannon Mills, Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988)
("The liability provisions of both [Title VII and ADEA] ... permit suits against individ-
ual supervisory employees who are deemed 'employer[s].' " (citations omitted)); Barger v.
Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Kan. 1985) (finding that the President, Vice President,
Dean, and Department Chairperson were agents of the University); Kelly v. Richland
Sch. Dist., 463 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D. S.C. 1978) (holding that the superintendent of a
school district, as an agent of the district, was an "employer" within the meaning of
§ 2000e(b)).
10. See Elias v. Sitomer, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
11. See 110 Cong. Rec. 13, 169 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of
Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 11 (1969).
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'Title VII... provides .. a clear mandate from Congress that no
longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimination. It is,
therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act works, and
the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict
construction of the statute in a battle with semantics.' 12
Because "Title VII is remedial in character and should be liberally
construed to achieve its purposes,"'13 courts have "rejected a myriad of
procedural and technical defenses invoked by defendants to limit the ef-
fectiveness of court-ordered remedies in Title VII cases."' 4 The trend,
therefore, has been toward granting broader remedies 5 and, despite any
"exceptions and limitations incorporated in the 1964 Act, the courts
have creatively interpreted Title VII and have found its meaning in the
basic, underlying purposes of the statute."' 6
Congress' frustration with the relative ineffectiveness of Title VII re-
sulted in attempts to improve the Act almost immediately after its enact-
ment.' 7 Subsequent amendments in 1972 and 1991 exhibited Congress'
increased commitment to a national policy against employment discrimi-
nation.' In enacting these amendments, Congress reiterated its inten-
tion that Title VII be liberally construed by courts,' 9 and acknowledged
that "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification" 20 was essential to
achieve the Act's ultimate purpose of eradicating employment
discrimination.
12. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)).
13. Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
14. Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 Indus. Rel. LJ. 1,
27 (1977).
15. See iL at 23.
16. Id. at 26.
17. See id at 32. As a result, in Congressional hearings in 1971, it was argued that
the Act "in most respects, proved to be a cruel joke ... [and] the time has come for
Congress to correct the defects of its own legislation. The promises of equal job opportu-
nity made in 1964 must be made realities .. " Id. at 48 (quoting S. Rep. No. 415, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess, 8 (1971)). Thus, Congress sought to expand Title VII's scope and to
provide the EEOC necessary enforcement powers. See id at 47.
18. See Jennifer M. Follette, Complete Justice" Upholding the Principles of Title VII
Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 651, 652
(1993). Follette argues that "[t]he policy, clearly supported in the purposes and remedies
of Title VII and the establishment of the EEOC, embodies both a deterrent goal of elimi-
nating discrimination in the workplace and a remedial goal of providing relief to discrimi-
nation victims." Id For a more thorough discussion of the 1991 Amendments, see supra
notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
19. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). These barriers may exist in
the form of psychological and dignitary harms. See, eg., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that Title VII gives employees the right to work in an
atmosphere without "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult").
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Congress again demonstrated its commitment to ending employment
discrimination when it passed the ADEA. While Title VII and the
ADEA are similar, the scope of relief under the ADEA is broader than
that under Title VII.2 1 While adopting Title VII's substantive prohibi-
tions against age discrimination in the workplace, Congress applied the
procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").22 Under the
FLSA, an 'employer' "includes any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee"23 and courts will
impose personal liability on such an individual.24 In adopting Title VII's
substantive prohibitions for the ADEA, Congress stated that the
ADEA's purpose, like that of Title VII, was to "eliminate discrimination
from the workplace." '25
Specifically, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary age discrimination against
any employee over forty.26 It provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such indi-
vidual's age."27 The ADEA prevents employers from predicating em-
ployment decisions on arbitrary age limits regardless of an employee's
ability to perform a given job.2" To achieve this goal, the ADEA autho-
rizes courts to grant relief to eradicate such discrimination and to return
the victims to the positions they would have occupied had the discrimi-
nation not occurred.29 To that end, a court may grant "'such legal and
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the
Act].' "30
Thus, Congress's intent, evidenced by the legislative histories and lan-
guage of both Title VII and the ADEA, is to eradicate unlawful discrimi-
nation in the workplace. These statutes should be liberally interpreted to
achieve that end.
21. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978).
22. See id. at 580.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) & (b) (1988). The FLSA was intended, moreover, to be a
"broadly remedial and humanitarian statute." Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d
139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977).
25. House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 162 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
26. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988). Older workers are also protected against age based
classification, expulsion from labor groups and retaliatory discharges. See David A.
Niles, The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act: Painting Age-Discrimination Law With
a Watery Brush, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 869, 872 (1992) (citations omitted).
28. See Daniel B. Frier, Age Discrimination and the ADA: How the ADA May Be
Used to Arm Older Americans Against Age Discrimination By Employers Who Would
Otherwise Escape Liability Under the ADEA, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 173, 177 (1993).
29. See J. Hardin Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 45 Md. L. Rev. 298, 298 (1986).
30. Id. at 302 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)).
31. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that Title
VII was "broad-gauged innovation legislation" that should be regarded as "a charter of
principles which are to be elucidated and explicated by experience, time, and expertise").
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II. WHO is AN EMPLOYER-THE COURTS DIVERGE
Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. Maxwell's International InC 32
held that individual employees cannot be held liable for their own dis-
criminatory acts under either Title VII or the ADEA. This decision par-
tially conflicts with decisions in the Fifth Circuit and several district
courts regarding Title VII, and the Seventh Circuit and several district
courts regarding the ADEA.33 The plaintiff in Miller sued six defendants
in their individual capacities34 under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the "EPA"),35 claiming she was not promoted
due to her age and sex.36 The Ninth Circuit stated that although the
argument advanced in support of individual liability, which was based on
the interpretation of Title VII's "and any agent" language, was "not
without merit," it was bound by Padway v. Palches37 which, in its opin-
ion, provided a better rule.38 The court determined that the "and any
agent" language was intended only to incorporate respondeat superior
liability into the statute, and supervisors are therefore protected from lia-
bility in their individual capacities. 39 It reasoned that "[t]he statutory
scheme itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual
liability on employees."'  The court found that by limiting liability
under Title VII to employers with at least 15 employees, Congress did
not want to impose the costs of litigating discrimination claims on small
entities. The court, noting that the ADEA and Title VII are statutorily
similar, applied this analysis to the ADEA as well.4
32. 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 948 (9th Cir. 1993).
33. See infra notes 49-77, 86-96 and accompanying text.
34. These included the Chief Executive Officer of Maxwell's International, the corpo-
rate owner of Maxwell's Plum restaurant where the plaintiff was employed, the general
managers of the restaurant and several lower level employees. See Miller, 61 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas., at 949-50.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (incorporated into and enforced through the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1988)).
36. In retaliation for her complaint to the union, Miller was fired, reinstated twice,
and ultimately fired for a third time. Upon receiving her right to sue letter from the
EEOC, she filed suit in the district court, where her claims were eventually dismissed.
See Miller, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 950.
37. 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982).
38. See id. at 952. In Padway, an elementary school principal brought suit against the
school board and the superintendent of her school alleging sex discrimination in her com-
pensation, reassignment and discharge. When granting summary judgment for the de-
fendants, the court noted "that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 speaks of unlawful practices by the
employer, and not of unlawful practices by officers or employees of the employer....
[Thus] individual defendants cannot be held liable for back pay." Padway, 665 F.2d at
968. The court also notes, however, that the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive
damages rather than back pay, but still dismisses the claim as these damages were not yet
provided for in the statute. Id
39. See Miller, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 952 (citing Padway v. Palches, 665
F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1982)).
40. Id The court found it "inconceivable" that Congress intended to expose individ-
uals to such liability. See id
41. See id at 952-53.
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The Miller dissent argued that the majority did not adequately address
the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the 1991 Amend-
ments"), which imposed compensatory and punitive damages for inten-
tional discrimination.42 The dissent reasoned that the 1991 Amendments
and the provision for compensatory and punitive damages justified im-
posing individual liability where the discrimination is intentional.4 3 It
also rejected the majority's rationale regarding the ADEA because,
although there are many similarities between the statutes, the ADEA's
scope of relief is broader than that afforded by Title VII. 44 The ADEA,
moreover, incorporates the remedies and procedures of the FLSA,4
under which an individual may be held personally liable.46
The Miller decision conflicts with several cases holding individuals
personally liable. In Hamilton v. Rodgers,47 the Fifth Circuit held that
not only was the employer (the fire department) itself liable for discrimi-
nation under Title VII under respondeat superior, but its individual em-
ployees and immediate supervisors as its agents were also liable.4" In
Hamilton, an employee brought a Title VII action against the fire depart-
ment and several supervisors alleging racial harassment and retaliation. 9
The court noted that "[t]he definition of 'employer' is... broad, includ-
ing agents of the actual employer."' Thus, Title VII "'should be ac-
corded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of
Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of
ethnic discrimination.' "I' Indeed, according to the court, "[t]o hold
otherwise would encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they
may violate Title VII with impunity. '5 2 Consequently, it extended liabil-
42. See id. at 953 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 954. "The availability of additional remedies, particularly one based on
willfulness of conduct, argues against a construction of the ADEA that limits to injunc-
tive relief the liability of the individual who acted willfully." House v. Cannon Mills Co.,
713 F. Supp. 159, 160 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
45. See supra note 22-24 and accompanying text.
46. See Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 948, 954 (9th
Cir. 1993).
47. 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986). In holding for the plaintiff, the lower court found
that there was a racist work environment and a deliberate effort to punish the plaintiff for
aggressively seeking equal treatment. See id. at 441. The supervisors were found liable
because they not only ignored the racist behavior of the plaintiff's co-workers, but also
intentionally discriminated against him themselves. See id. at 442. The supervisors did
not provide the plaintiff with adequate training. As a result, his skills diminished, and the
supervisors were able to then claim justifiable dismissal. See id.
48. See id. at 442-44.
49. See id. at 441. The elements necessary to make out a prima facie case for unlaw-
ful retaliation are: (1) the plaintiff was engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2)
an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the plaintiff's participation in the pro-
tected activity caused the adverse employment action. See Dickerson v. Dade County,
659 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442.
51. Id. at 442 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
52. Id. at 443.
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ity to Hamilton's immediate supervisors, "despite their intermediate
standing within the [d]epartment's hierarchy," because they had author-
ity over staffing, assignment, and other employment decisions which
formed the basis of the discrimination.53
Other courts have also held individuals liable under Title VII. For
example, in Kolb v. Ohio, Department of Mental Retardation & Develop-
ment Disabilities,4 the court held that individuals may be liable for in-
tentional discrimination in the workplace." In Kolb, the plaintiff
brought charges against her employer and three individual supervisors
for twice failing to promote her, for discharging her on the basis of her
race and sex, and for retaliating against her for past charges of discrimi-
nation.56 The court rejected the individual defendants' summary judg-
ment motions stating:
'Holding responsible those who control the aspects of employment ac-
corded protection under Title VII is consistent with the congressional
intent both that the Act's effectiveness not be frustrated by an em-
ployer's delegating authority ... and that the Act be interpreted liber-
ally in order to achieve its remedial purpose of eradicating
discrimination in employment.' s5
The court concluded that "those individuals who are charged with the
responsibility of making and/or contributing to employment decisions
for the defendant employer may be liable as its agents under Title VII.""
Similarly, in McAdoo v. Toll,59 the court held that agents of a Univer-
sity were individually liable for discrimination.' In McAdoo, a black
woman sued a University and its Chancellor, President, Department
Deans and Department Heads, for failing to uphold its job offer because
of her race.61 The court denied the defendants' motion for summary
53. Id at 442. Hamilton was subsequently limited by Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226
(5th Cir. 1990), which distinguished between public officials' liability in their unofficial
and official capacities. See idL at 227-28. In Harvey, the plaintiff, employed as an Inspec-
tor in Houston's Public Service Department, alleged that he was sexually harassed by his
supervisor, the defendant. See id at 227. The court said that under a "liberal construc-
tion" of the statute's definition of employer, "immediate supervisors are Employers when
delegated the employer's traditional rights, such as hiring and firing." Id. But any recov-
ery against the defendant had to be predicated on the defendant's role as an agent of the
city in her official capacity. See id. at 227-28.
54. 721 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
55. See id. at 891.
56. See id at 888. The elements of discriminatory failure to promote are: (1) that she
is a member of a protected class; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for a position
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she
was rejected; and (4) that a member of a non-protected class subsequently received the
position. See id. at 889-90.
57. Id. at 891 (quoting Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 475 F. Supp. 1298,
1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in relevant part, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982)).
58. Id
59. 591 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Md. 1984).
60. See id at 1405-06.
61. The plaintiff claimed that after she orally accepted a professorship, she received a
1994] 1841
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judgment, and held them individually liable.62 The McAdoo court relied
upon, among other cases, Dague v. Riverdale Athletic Association,63
which rejected the individual defendants' claim that they were not "em-
ployers" within the statutory definition of Title VII." The Dague court
said that the defendants failed to "explain why officers of an organization
should be treated any differently from the organization's agents, who are
clearly subject to liability under the Act."' 65 Furthermore, the court
found it inconceivable that Congress could have intended to relieve from
liability the very persons who engaged in the discriminatory acts.66
Courts have also held individuals liable in ADEA actions. In Shager
v. Upjohn Co. ,67 the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court's grant of a
summary judgment motion in favor of the employer, finding that an in-
tentional act of an employee performed within the scope of his authority
is an act of the employer and is properly imputed to the employer under
respondeat superior. The court implied that individual supervisors
should also be held liable under the ADEA. It stated that "[t]he statu-
tory language ... could mean ... that [the supervisor] is liable along
with [the employer], or even possibly instead of [the employer]. 68
In Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope, Co. ,69 the court expressly held that
individuals who exercise control over a particular employee may be held
individually liable for discrimination under the ADEA. In Wanamaker,
the plaintiff claimed that during his interview for a position as in-house
counsel for the defendant company, he received verbal assurances that it
would be a "career position."7 After thirteen years, however, he was
terminated. He claimed this violated the ADEA, citing as evidence the
directors' and officers' stated desires for "new blood" and "young
letter saying her application had been denied. The position was subsequently filled, as a
lower level position, by a white woman. See id. at 1401.
62. See id. at 1406. The court looked to several cases for support. See, e.g., York v.
Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n., 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[A]n agent of an
employer who may be sued as an employee in Title VII suits has been construed to be a
supervisory or managerial employee to whom employment decisions have been delegated
by the employer."); Rivas v. State Bd. for Community Colleges, 517 F. Supp. 467, 470
(D. Colo. 1981) ("For Title VII purposes, it is not necessary for individuals.., to have
total control or ultimate authority over hiring decisions. If the involvement is sufficient
and necessary to the total employment process, the individual is considered an
employer.").
63. 99 F.R.D. 325, 327 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The opinion does not clearly set forth the




67. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
68. Id. at 404. The court added that because "all employees are agents," and the
statute states that agents are "liable along with [the employer] ... [plaintiff] could have
sued [the individual defendant]." Id. (citing House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp.
159, 159-62 (M.D.N.C. 1988)).
69. 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 764 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
70. Id. at 765. "Career position" seemed to imply that the position would continue
until retirement, as it did for plaintiff's predecessor. See id.
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blood."7 1 The court determined that "corporate officers and directors
may be individually liable for violations of the ADEA if they exercise
control over an employee." 72
Similarly, in House v. Cannon Mills Co.,73 the court found the defend-
ants individually liable for violations of the ADEA, even though they
were not high ranking officers or shareholders. Because the defendants
had authority over the discriminatory acts that resulted in the plaintiff's
discharge, the court found that they were "'agents' ... and 'employers'
within the express language of the statute. ' 74 Furthermore, because the
existing scope of relief under the ADEA is much broader than that under
Title VII, and because the ADEA incorporated much of the FLSA,
which imposes personal liability on all "employers," the defendants were
held liable under the ADEA.75
As there are conflicting interpretations among different circuits and
different districts that have considered the issue of individual liability
under Title VII and the ADEA, there are conflicting interpretations
within district courts as well. The Southern District of New York, for
example, seems to have abandoned its initial denial of individual liability
under Title VII and the ADEA, and has recently imposed such liability.
In 1980, the Southern District of New York, in Friend v. Union Dime
Savings Bank,76 found that individual defendants could not be held liable
for age discrimination under the ADEA. The plaintiff, a sixty-five year
old bank employee, sued three officers and trustees of the bank after they
replaced him with a thirty-nine year old employee and terminated him
after he refused to sign a voluntary retirement plan.77 The court ex-
amined the legislative histories of the ADEA and Title VII,7" but found
that they were both silent on the issue of individual liability, despite the
"and any agent" language.79
The court then looked at the National Labor Relations Act ° for gui-
dance, because Title VII was "in large part" based on the language of the
NLRA. 1 Analyzing the legislative history of the NLRA, it concluded
71. Id at 766.
72. Id at 769 (citing House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C.
1988)).
73. 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
74. Id at 161.
75. Id at 161-62. The court says that individuals were held accountable under the
FLSA, not because of their control of or ownership in the company, but because the
FLSA violations were "attributable to them due to their authority over employment deci-
sions." Id at 161.
76. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
77. See id. at 1307-08.
78. Title VII was used as an example in enacting the ADEA. See id. at 1309.
79. Id. at 1309-10.
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-157 (1988).
81. See Friend v. Union Dime Says. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1307,
1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The NLRA was amended in 1947, changing the definition of
employer from "any person acting in the interest of an employer," to "any person acting
as an agent of the employer." Id (citations omitted). In amending the NLRA, Congress
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that the "and any agent" language of the NLRA was "an attempt to
limit the employer's liability rather than to grant a new cause of action
against all agents or employees of an employer.""2 Applying the same
reasoning to the ADEA, the court held that the individual defendants
were employees of the bank and not agents within the meaning of the
statute.83
Twelve years later, however, in Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co.," the
same court found that the "[c]ases in this Circuit ... appear to assume
that both individual and official liability can be imposed under Title
VII."' In Bridges, three women alleged constructive discharge due to
sexual harassment under Title VII. Without reference to Friend, which
had been decided before the 1991 Amendments, the court followed Sec-
ond Circuit cases which assumed that individual liability could be im-
posed.8 6 It declined to read Title VII narrowly, especially in light of the
1991 Amendments providing compensatory and punitive damages.8 7 In-
stead, it noted that compensatory and punitive damages are payable by
individuals, and that the cases interpreting Title VII narrowly were de-
cided before the 1991 Amendments. It concluded, therefore, that indi-
vidual liability should be imposed. 8
In Elias v. Sitomer, 9 the same court upheld individual liability under
the ADEA. Unlike the defendant in Friend, who was not found individ-
ually liable, the defendant here was a president of a corporation and
therefore an actual employer within the meaning of the Act.90 In Elias,
the plaintiff alleged that the president of the company in which he was
employed denied him salary increases while giving raises to younger em-
ployers; required him to answer to younger, less experienced employees;
barred him from client meetings; withheld assistance from him; and re-
ferred to him as "the old fashioned, old time salesman using old time
methods."'" The court explained that although the Friend court consid-
ered the supervisor's lack of ownership interest to be dispositive,92 other
decisions were "more persuasive. 9 3 It concluded that "a substantial
intended to restrict an employer's liability for the acts of individuals "remotely connected
with the employer." Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), re-
printed in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. 1135).
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. 800 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
85. Id. at 1180 (citing Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1322-24 (2d Cir. 1992)).
86. See id.
87. See id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (1991)).
88. See Bridges, 800 F. Supp. at 1180.
89. 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
90. See id. at 761.
91. Id. at 759 (quoting plaintifi's complaint).
92. See id. at 761 (citing Friend v. Union Dime Say. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1307, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
93. Elias, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 761. The other decisions the court was refer-
ring to were House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988) and
Wanamaker v. Columbia Rope Co., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 764 (N.D.N.Y.
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ownership interest is not necessary... to create employer status."'" This
reasoning seems to evidence a broader view of individual liability in the
context of employment discrimination.
Interpretation of the statutory language and the legislative histories
has resulted in conflicting decisions regarding individual liability under
both Title VII and the ADEA. Without guidance from the Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit implicitly, and several dis-
trict courts have imposed individual liability under either Title VII or the
ADEA,95 while most recently the Ninth Circuit has rejected such liabil-
ity under both Title VII and the ADEA.9 6 Part III argues that based on
a review of the purposes and legislative histories of Title VII and the
ADEA, courts should, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Miller,
hold individuals liable for their own acts of discrimination.
III. COURTS CAN AND SHOULD HOLD INDIVIDUALS LIABLE
UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
The crux of the courts' disputes over individual liability focuses on the
statutory definitions of "employer."9 Both Title VII and the ADEA
define "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry ... and any agent
of such person."9" While interpreting these definitions to mean that any
employee or agent of an employer is an employer seems overly broad, the
view that those employees with direct control over substantive employ-
ment decisions are employers is consistent with the Acts' definitions and
purposes.99 Indeed, as the Southern District of New York reasoned as to
Title VII, holding responsible those with direct control over hiring, firing
and other pertinent employment decisions who intentionally discriminate
is consistent with congressional intent to not frustrate the Act's effective-
ness through the delegation of authority. It also satisfies congressional
desire that Title VII be liberally interpreted to achieve its goal of eradi-
cating employment discrimination. 100
1990), both holding that officers with authority over hiring and firing decisions are agents
of the corporation and employers within the statutory definition. See supra notes 67-73
and accompanying text.
94. Elias, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 761.
95. See supra notes 47-75, 76-94 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
99. See, e.g., York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone, Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir.
1982) ("Generally, an agent of an employer who may be sued as an employee in Title VII
suits has been construed to be a supervisory or managerial employee to whom employ-
ment decisions have been delegated...."); McAdoo v. Toll, 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1406 (D.
Md. 1984) ("[A]n individual occupying a supervisory position could be held liable for the
acts of his underlings when the employer of both can also be held liable, [even] where the
supervisor has no personal involvement .... [because] placing an affirmative duty to
prevent discriminatory acts on those who are charged with employment decisions appears
to be consistent with the aims of Title VII.").
100. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), affd in relevant part, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Several courts adopting this view have imposed individual liability
under Title VII. 101 This view is consistent with congressional intent that
Title VII "eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of
ethnic discrimination." 10 2
The 1991 Amendments01 further clarify the purpose of Title VII and
support holding individuals liable."° Specifically, in the "findings and
purposes" of the 1991 Amendments, Congress noted the need for addi-
tional remedies and protections to eradicate discrimination and harass-
ment in the workplace, and the need to expand the scope of the
statute.10 5 Accordingly, Section 102(a)(1) of the 1991 Amendments pro-
vides that "the complaining party may recover compensatory and puni-
tive damages" from those who intentionally discriminated. 10 6 As the
Bridges court recognized, these are the types of damages individuals
would and could be expected to pay.107 Imposing liability on such indi-
viduals for their own acts of intentional discrimination corresponds with
Congress's desire to provide increased remedies and protections under
Title VII to the victims of employment discrimination and
harassment. 10 8
101. See, e.g., Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist., 537 F. Supp. 966,
970 (D. Colo. 1982) ("A person is an agent under 2000e(b) if he participated in the
decision making process that forms the basis of the discrimination."); see also supra notes
48-64, 82-91 and accompanying text.
102. Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Rodgers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238) (5th Cir. 1971)).
103. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1991)).
104. See id.
105. See id. The Act states in pertinent part:
The Congress finds that-
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful har-
assment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment.
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and un-
lawful harassment in the workplace;
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination.
Id. The series of Supreme Court cases to which the Act refers are Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989); and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). See J.R.
Franke, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Remedial Civil Rights Policies Prevail, 17 S. I11. U.
L.J. 267, 269-72 (1993). These cases "altered existing law [and represented a] retreat
from civil rights protections." Id. at 267.
106. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991).
107. See Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
108. See id.
SUPER VISOR'S LIABILITY
In adopting the 1991 Amendments, Congress sought to strengthen Ti-
tle VII's protections and remedies " by legislatively overturning several
Supreme Court decisions that had limited Title VII protections."' Thus,
the 1991 Amendments sought "to reinstate the previous scope and effec-
tiveness of the civil rights laws and to expand remedies to more ade-
quately compensate victims and deter unlawful discrimination.""'
Accordingly, the 1991 Amendments provide remedies for previously
unrecoverable injuries." 2 These remedies "not only reflect the continu-
ing congressional belief in the principles of Title VII; they also reflect the
gradual development and societal commitment to the national policy
against discrimination,""' 3 and "Congressional intent to... support lib-
eral interpretation and application of... the civil rights laws."" 4 Find-
ing individual liability under Title VII, therefore, corresponds with a
broad interpretation of the statute.
A flexible approach to interpreting "employer" is appropriate for the
ADEA as well.I" Before looking at the ADEA, one must first consider
the FLSA, the statute from which the ADEA adopts many of its provi-
sions." 6 As noted in House v. Cannon Mills Co., 7 relief under the
ADEA is even broader than that under Title VII because of the ADEA's
incorporation of FLSA provisions." 8 Under the FLSA, "'[e]mployer'
includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an em-
ployer in relation to an employee."" 9 For purposes of the ADEA, then,
any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the em-
ployer in relation to an employee shall be subject to the same liability
as the employer... [L]iability is predicated not on the existence of the
employer employee relationship... but on the acts [the person] per-
forms in relation to the employee. 120
This broad interpretation of "employer" further supports the ADEA's
purpose of eliminating employment discrimination.' 2' It advances the
109. See Heather K. Gerken, Note, Understanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis of Intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-
Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1824, 1838 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 40,
infra note 110, pt 2, at 1, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694).
110. See H.R. Rep. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt 2, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 694.
111. Franke, supra note 105, at 272 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 2 (1990)).
112. See Follette, supra note 18, at 655.
113. Id
114. Franke, supra note 105, at 298.
115. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
117. 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988); see supra notes 70-73.
118. See House, 713 F. Supp. at 160-62.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988).
120. Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope, Co., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 764, 769
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Schultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Const. Co., 309
F. Supp. 1255 (D. Mass. 1970)).
121. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Specifically, the ADEA prohibits
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goals of the ADEA to prevent discrimination based on age without re-
gard to ability and to promote the employment of older workers. 22 Sup-
porting these goals will prevent situations where older people arbitrarily
lose their jobs without remedy or recourse, while the discriminating su-
pervisors shield themselves with the statute that was intended to be
swords for those discriminated against.
The law of agency also supports individual liability under Title VII
and the ADEA. Agency law seems to dictate that the "and any agent"
language in the statutes was not included to ensure that the acts of an
employee be imputed to the employer through respondeat superior.
23
Instead, because "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his ser-
vants committed while acting in the scope of their employment,"' 124 the
"and any agent" language is more likely intended to apply to supervisors
who intentionally discriminate. The Restatement (Second) of Agency
adds that an agent's conduct is within the scope of employment if "(a) it
is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within
the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master."' 25 A supervisor or manager,
then, with authority over specific employment decisions who intention-
ally discriminates in the administration of those decisions is an agent of
the company for the purpose of liability under both Title VII and the
ADEA. Faithful application of the laws of agency and interpretation of
the statutory language, therefore, militate strongly toward imposing indi-
vidual liability on supervisors who discriminate.
Some may argue, however, that individual liability is inapplicable
under both Title VII and the ADEA because the prospect of potentially
debilitating judgments against those found individually liable may make
courts less likely to find discrimination than if the corporate entity with
deep pockets and/or hefty insurance coverage were being burdened with
the damages.
This result, however, is not likely. Compensatory and punitive dam-
ages are awarded only when the conduct complained of is egregious.
Presumably, these damages will not be awarded where the conduct does
not so merit, and a finding of a Title VII violation should not depend on
the size of the damage award or who is paying it. Moreover, Title VII
imposes limits on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded,
age discrimination where compensation, terms or benefits of compensation are concerned
and prohibits classifications that serve to limit or otherwise adversely affect one's employ-
ment status. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
122. See supra note 28 and accompanying text
123. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
124. Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 219(1) (1958). Also, "courts have consist-
ently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory
personnel, whether or not the employee knew, should have known, or approved of the
supervisor's actions." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986). Thus,
respondeat superior liability is built into the statute.
125. Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 228(1)(a)-(c) (1958).
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ranging from $50,000 to $300,000,126 further protecting the individual
from excessive awards.
Another potential argument against individual liability is that supervi-
sors may become reluctant to fire or not promote employees because of
fears that Title VII or ADEA actions will be brought against them indi-
vidually. If, however, the employment action is legitimate, such fears are
unwarranted, because justified dismissals or non-promotions have not, do
not, and will not lead to a finding of liability for either the employer or
the supervisors. Failure by the plaintiff to prove his dismissal was due to
unlawful discrimination would preclude a finding in his favor,'27 as the
126. The limitations imposed on intentional discrimination by Title VII are
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000;
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, £300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
Although the individual defendant may not employ the statutory minimum, the indi-
vidual as an agent of an employer with at least fifteen employers is an employer within
the statutory definition. See, e.g., Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980)
(determining that a Sheriff, as agent of the county, is an employer under Title VII). In
Owens, a former deputy sheriff brought a Title VII action against the sheriff for sexual
discrimination in her pay and promotion. See id. at 285. The court found that although
the sheriff's department itself did not employ fifteen employees, it was an agent of the
County which did employ more than fifteen people. The sheriff, therefore, was an "em-
ployer" within the meaning of Title VII, and plaintiff's suit should not have been dis-
missed. See id, at 286-87. The court added that "[w]hatever the reason for excluding
employers with fewer than fifteen employees from Title VII coverage, it should not be
construed to exempt a... subdivision with many employees from Title VII proscriptions
on grounds that the immediate employing agent has fewer than fifteen employees." Id. at
287.
127. As to the ADEA,
the fact that an older worker is treated worse than a younger one ... is not
enough to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination .... [O]nce the
employee shows that he was replaced by a younger person even though he was
performing up to his employer's expectations, the burden shifts to the employer
to present evidence that the employee was replaced for a reason unrelated to his
age or that of his replacement.
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400-01 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Dale v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, "[t]he statute is not a
guarantee of tenure for the older worker," so that "it is not a violation of the age discrimi-
nation law to fire an employee for insufficient cause, merely because the employee is more
than forty ... and is replaced by a younger person." Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
As to Title VII, "[tihe plaintiff.., must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination." Kolb v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Ret. & Dev., 721 F. Supp.
885, 889 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)). The prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination 'only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the con-
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imposition of individual liability does not alter the plaintiff's burden of
proof.
Furthermore, because the statutes were originally intended to elimi-
nate employment discrimination and, in the case of Title VII, later
amended to strengthen that aim,128 they should be liberally and flexibly
construed to meet that goal.' 2 9 A reasonable and faithful interpretation
of the statutory language would, therefore, impose liability where it be-
longs: on those who actually discriminate.
CONCLUSION
To further advance the goals of Title VII and the ADEA, and to ac-
complish the purposes which Congress intended through the statutes, the
"and any agent" language in the statutes' definitions of "employer"
should be read, not as ensuring that individuals who discriminate can
escape liability, but rather as ensuring that individuals who act within
their supervisory positions to render discriminatorily motivated decisions
are held accountable for those acts.
sideration of impermissible factors.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
128. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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